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INTRODUCTION
Tournament-based incentive systems reward employees based on performance rankings within a reference group. While in most cases, tournaments are used to determine allocations of favorable outcomes, such as promotions, recognition, or monetary rewards, tournament-based incentive systems involving both rewards and penalties are often observed in practice. For example, General Electric's "vitality curve" made the employees ranked in the top 20% of the performance distribution eligible for pay raises, bonuses, or promotion, while those in the bottom 10% would likely be demoted, reassigned to less prestigious roles, or at risk of losing their jobs.
1 Other examples include "up or out" systems, common in the military and in many service industries (i.e.
investment banking, consulting, public accounting, academia, etc.) by which employees that do not meet the standards for promotion are asked to leave the organization (Anand, Gardner, and Morris [2007] , Lazear [1991] ). While these performance evaluation systems are heavily based on objective performance measures, they often include important elements of subjectivity.
Significant literature on incentive systems has addressed the benefits and costs of subjectivity in compensation contracting and performance evaluation (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy [1994] , Baker, Jensen, and Murphy [1988] , Bol [2007] , Prendergast [1999] , Prendergast and Topel [1993] ). Prior studies show that the use of subjectivity, while useful to curb some of the shortcomings of objective performance measurement systems (Baiman and Rajan [1995] , Baker et al. [1994] , Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus [2004] ), is often confounded with bias (Gibbs et al. [2004] , Prendergast and Topel [1993] ), and can generate perceptions of unfairness and procedural injustice (Baker et al. [1988] , Ittner, Larcker, and Meyer [2003] , Moers [2005] , Prendergast [1999] ). Accordingly, if the allocation of rewards and penalties critically hinges on subjective performance evaluations, tournament-based incentives may introduce unintended motivation effects.
Prior research on tournament incentives has primarily focused on single period tournaments, where the incentive effect operates ex-ante -that is, the prospect of receiving a reward or penalty influences individual effort choices relative to the period in which the tournament takes place (Campbell [2008] , Hannan, Hoffman, and Moser [2005] , Lazear and Rosen [1981] , Libby and Lipe [1992] ). In practice, however, tournaments often span across multiple periods of performance measurement (Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez [2009] , Ederer [2010] , Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman [2008] ), or repeat multiple times over consecutive periods (Berger, Klassen, Libby, and Webb [2013] ). In these cases, the choice of effort in any given period might be influenced by prior outcomes. While prior literature provides evidence of dysfunctional behaviors, such as complacency and giving-up, associated with interim feedback effects (CasasArce and Martinez-Jerez [2009] ) or prior tournament results (Berger et al. [2013] ), the effects of subjectivity on subsequent choices of effort are largely unexplored.
Using subjectivity to determine tournament rewards and penalties often results in an expost override of rankings compiled on the basis of objective performance measures (hereafter: objective rankings). 2 That is, workers may receive a reward despite not being ranked at the top of the objective ranking (subjective reward), or a penalty despite not being ranked at the bottom (subjective penalty). We posit that, due to the 'zero-sum game' structure of tournament incentive systems, whereby the number of winners and losers is pre-determined and bounded, subjective 2 Subjectivity could also be introduced in the relative weights assigned to different performance measures (Bol [2007] , Campbell [2008] ).
overrides of objective rankings also give rise to implicit rewards (i.e. avoiding a penalty while ranked at the bottom of the objective ranking) and implicit penalties (i.e. missing out on a reward while being ranked at the top). In this study, we explore the influence of subjective and implicit rewards and penalties on workers' subsequent effort choices and performance.
We use field data from a Chinese manufacturing firm that operates a tournament-based incentive system linked to departmental performance. In each month of production, members of the department with highest performance receive a monetary bonus, while members of the worst performing department are penalized with deductions from their pay. The reward/penalty decision is made by top executives of the firm and is based on both objective and subjective assessments.
At the end of each month, the firm discloses to all members of the organization both the objective performance rankings and the ultimate awardees of the reward and penalty, but there is no disclosure of the subjective criteria informing the decision or of the weights assigned respectively to objective and subjective elements of performance. 3 Therefore, employees can detect and measure the extent to which subjective assessments override the objective rankings to award rewards and penalties, but do not receive explicit information about the determinants of the override. This setting allows us to empirically observe how workers react to subjective overrides of objective performance rankings, and to examine the effect of implicit rewards and penalties on subsequent workers performance.
We find that assigning rewards and penalties subjectively elicits different workers reactions with respect to subsequent effort and performance compared to the determination of rewards and penalties based on objective rankings alone. That is, workers react not only to receiving a reward or a penalty, but also to the procedure by which rewards and penalties were assigned. In particular, while rewards awarded based on objective rankings are associated with a subsequent performance decline, subjective rewards drive an increase in subsequent performance. With respect to penalties, instead, we find no significant reaction to penalties assigned based on objective performance, while subjective penalties are associated with a subsequent performance decline. This combination of results is consistent with the predictions of equity theory and reciprocity (Akerlof [1984] , Falk and Fischbacher [2006] , Fehr and Schmidt [1995] ).
Next, we study the effects of implicit rewards and penalties. That is -we examine the reactions of workers that, due to subjective overrides of objective performance, miss out on (are spared from) the reward (penalty) they would have received in absence of subjectivity. Our results document that implicit rewards (penalties) induced by subjective performance evaluations are significantly associated with subsequent performance improvements (declines). Even if the economic effect of implicit rewards and penalties is only defined in terms of opportunity costs (i.e.
there are no actual cash inflows or outflows because workers do not receive a bonus or a pay cut in this case), workers appear to experience implicit rewards or penalties in similar fashion as they do explicit subjective ones, in line with the predictions of reference-dependent preferences (Koszegi and Rabin [2006] ). This result suggests that tournament-based incentives may have wideranging incentive effects spanning beyond the ultimate awardees of rewards and penalties.
Finally, we analyze the net performance effects of subjectivity. Because of the mechanical relation described above, positive performance effects associated with subjective rewards might be diminished by negative effects associated with corresponding implicit penalties. Similarly, negative effects generated by subjective penalties might be counterbalanced by positive effects associated with implicit rewards. We in fact find that the net performance effect between paired explicit and implicit rewards and penalties is non-distinguishable from zero. Taken together, our results indicate that, in tournament settings, effects arising from subjective rewards (penalties) might be muted by effects of opposite sign associated with implicit penalties (rewards).
Our study offers several contributions to the literature and to the practice of incentive design. First, our study is the first to document the existence of implicit rewards and penalties in tournament settings where performance evaluations involve elements of subjectivity. Prior literature has primarily focused on the incentive effects related to members of the organization that were directly affected by subjective performance evaluations. We extend the knowledge on the use of subjectivity in incentive contracting by exploring its consequences relative to members of the organization that are indirectly impacted by the subjective decision via implicit rewards and penalties.
Second, we contribute to the scant literature on repeated and dynamic tournaments by providing field-based empirical evidence on the role of subjectivity in performance evaluations and its effect on subsequent effort choices. Additionally, our paper focuses on rank-and-file workers, which have received insufficient attention in the literature on tournament incentives.
Third, we extend the empirical literature on penalties. Extant research has addressed subjectivity predominantly from a bonus-allocation standpoint, limiting the consideration of subjective penalties to a minimum (McLeod [2003] , Rajan and Reichelstein [2009] ). Important research stemming from the seminal work of Kahneman and Tverski [1979] and Thaler [1980] has provided evidence that individuals do not experience rewards and penalties as symmetrical changes in utility (Franciosi, Kujal, Michelitsch, Smith, and Deng [1996] , Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1990] , Luft [1994] ). Therefore, the effects of subjective rewards on effort allocation documented by the literature may not be directly extended to the case of subjective penalties. Our study provides insights into the interplay between the effects of subjective rewards and subjective penalties on subsequent performance.
Finally, our findings are relevant to the practice of incentive contracting because, despite individual preferences for incentive systems framed in positive terms over systems associated with penalties (Christ, Sedatole, and Towry [2012] , Kahneman and Tverski [1979] , Lazear [1991 ], Luft [1994 ), tournament systems including both reward and penalty mechanisms continue to be observed and to include important elements of subjective evaluation. Our study sheds light on potential pitfalls, and documents the existence of counterbalancing effects that might reduce the overall effectiveness of these types of incentives.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we provide an account of relevant theories and prior empirical work related to the purpose of our study. Next, we describe the field settings (Section III) and the research design (Section IV). Section V presents the results of our main statistical tests and our inferences. We report the results of supplemental and robustness tests in Section VI. The last section concludes.
II. RELEVANT LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
A large portion of the literature on tournament incentive schemes focuses on single-period tournaments (Baker et al. [1988] ), where ex-ante effort choices of the workers impact the probability of receiving a reward or a penalty. However, some studies in accounting posit that the incentive effects of a tournament scheme do not necessarily exhaust their influence once the prizes are awarded. For example, Campbell [2008] finds that certain performance improvements achieved in hope of winning the tournament persist in the aftermath even for employees that did not win the prize; Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez [2009] study the effect of interim feedback in multi-period contests, where the performance of each period contributes to the final ranking and the awarding of prizes; Berger et al. [2013] study the effect of winning and losing on subsequent performance in a series of independent repeated tournaments. Repeated tournaments appear to be pervasive in practice (Berger et al. [2013] ).
Extensive research in accounting and economics has addressed many aspects of tournament incentives, including the size of the delta between winning and losing prizes (Becker and Huselid [1992] , Lazear and Rosen [1981] , Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983] ), the number of contestants (Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983] ), the provision and form of interim feedback (Casas-Arce and Ederer [2010] , Hannan et al. [2008] ). Little attention, however, has been devoted to the fact that the determination of winners and losers in a tournament is often impacted by subjective elements of performance evaluation (Campbell [2008] ).
The general consensus of prior literature addressing subjectivity in incentive contracting is that a system of performance evaluation that includes both objective metrics and some elements of subjectivity is superior to systems based on objective measures alone (Baker et al. [1994] , Gibbs et al. [2004] ). Objective performance metrics, albeit informative of workers' effort and therefore useful for incentive contracting (Holmstrom [1979] ), are imperfect to the extent that they lack sensitivity or precision (Banker and Datar [1989] , Feltham and Xie [1994] ), that they allow for gaming (Baker et al. [1994] , Hopwood [1972] ), and that they provide distorted incentives often focused excessively on the short term (Baker et al. [1994] , Bol [2007] , Kaplan and Norton [1992] ).
One view is that integrating subjective performance evaluation components yields Pareto improvements over incentive contracting based on objective performance metrics alone (Baiman and Rajan [1995] ).
Subjective performance evaluations can correct many of the shortcomings of objective metrics. For example, subjectivity improves incentive contracting by allowing inclusion of information that could not be foreseen ex-ante, thereby saving the cost of renegotiating the contract, and, at the same time, reducing the risk for the manager, thus lowering the cost of the incentive contract (Baker et al. [1988] , Bol [2007] ). Additionally, subjectivity can be used to foster a long term view among employees, and subjective evaluations can help supervisors deal with interdependencies among subordinates' performance (Gibbs et al. [2004] ). Nonetheless, because subjectivity is subject to bias, it carries the risk of distorting the incentive system and reducing its effectiveness altogether (Gibbs et al. [2004] , Moers [2005] ).
Perceived bias removes or weakens the connection between effort and payoffs, thereby increasing the risk and reducing the expected value of subordinates' investment of time and effort (Aryee, Chen, and Budhwar [2004] , Ittner et al. [2003] ). Employees may, therefore, become less motivated and offer lower levels of effort in the future (Moers [2005] ). 4 Claims of biased performance evaluation procedures or unfair treatment are more likely when the result of subjective performance evaluation yields unfavorable outcomes (Cropanzano and Folger [1989] , Matsumura and Shin [2006] ).
Our first research question explores whether subjective tournament outcomes (i.e. rewards and penalties) yield subsequent performance effects that are different from those associated with objective rankings. In other words, we explore whether workers react to the methodology by which a tournament outcome is determined in addition to the outcome itself. If workers are motivated simply by tournament outcomes (i.e. receiving a reward or a penalty), then we should observe similar reactions, independently from the methodology by which rewards and penalties were assigned. On the other hand, if workers react also to the procedure by which those outcomes are 4 Prior research also posits that social norms such as reputation and desirability bias of the supervisor limit the deliberate application of favoritism and discrimination, especially in repeated interactions, where the subordinate's reactions to the subjective assessment might influence performance in multiple future periods (Bol [2007] , Prendergast [1999] We do not formalize a directional expectation for H1 for the following reasons. If integrating subjective evaluations yields improvements in the effectiveness of an incentive contract based on objective evaluations (Baiman and Rajan [1995] ), then we should observe superior subsequent performance associated with subjective tournament outcomes compared to outcomes determined uniquely on the basis of objective performance evaluations. On the other hand, if subjective allocations of rewards and penalties are perceived to be biased, workers might reduce effort in an attempt to reduce costs in presence of increased risk (Gibbs et al. [2004] , McLeod
[2003], Prendergast and Topel [1993] ). In this case, performance subsequent to receiving a reward or penalty assigned subjectively should be lower, all else equal, than performance subsequent to objectively determined awards. Additionally, because individuals do not experience gains and losses as symmetric changes in utility (Kahneman and Tverski [1979] , Thaler [1980] ), reactions to tournament outcomes might also differ with respect to the type of outcome -that is, reactions to rewards might differ from reactions to penalties.
Prior research has explored the influence of wins and losses on effort choices in tournament settings, albeit without finding a consensus. Muller and Schotter [2009] instead, find that contestants that receive interim feedback signaling their leading position in a multi-period tournament tend to become complacent and reduce their subsequent effort, while contestants ranked at the bottom of the interim rankings give up, but only if the gap between their position and the winning levels of performance becomes too large. Berger et al. [2013] analyze repeated tournaments and find that winners' complacency is observed immediately after the prize is awarded, while employees that did not receive the reward tend to give up in the medium term and only after having attempted a change in strategy. In addition to reaching different conclusions with respect to the reactions of winners and losers, none of the aforementioned studies take into consideration the effect of subjectivity, or account for the effect of penalties (i.e. in those studies contestants ranked at the bottom do not receive any reward, but are also not inflicted any penalty).
Our study begins to fill this gap.
Recipients of subjective rewards (penalties) might interpret them as favorable (unfavorable) treatment. Economists and social psychologists have theorized and shown empirically that reciprocal behavior plays a role in many important economic domains (Malmendier, te Velde, and Weber [2014] ), including labor exchanges (Akerlof [1982] , Akerlof [1984] ). Reciprocity theory predicts that workers receiving favorable treatment will respond with greater effort than contractually required, while those subject to unfavorable treatment will exhibit undesired behaviors, ranging from lower than expected effort to retaliatory actions that may damage the profitability of the firm (Falk and Fischbacher [2006] , Fehr and Schmidt [1995] , Krueger and Mas [2009] ). If subjectivity is perceived as bias and workers experience subjective rewards as a "gift" and subjective penalties as "injustice", then we will observe positive reactions (i.e. increases in subsequent effort and performance) to the former and negative ones to the latter, as workers attempt to rebalance the economic exchange with their organization (Akerlof [1984] , Falk and Fischbacher [2006] ).
In addition to workers reactions to receiving a subjective reward or penalty, we are also interested in studying potential spillover effects that might impact other workers participating in the tournament. While prior research has highlighted the general effects of subjectivity in performance evaluations (Bol [2007] , Campbell [2008] , Gibbs et al. [2004] , Moers [2005] ), we focus our attention on workers for whom the application of subjectivity has the most impact. That is, in addition to workers that did receive subjective rewards and penalties, we study the reactions of workers that would have received the reward or penalty in absence of subjective overrides of objective rankings.
Tournaments restrict the number of rewards available and, in case of incentive contracts including both rewards and penalties, force to identify a number of contestants that will suffer a penalty. The combination of the forced rankings and the predetermination of prizes and penalties (Prendergast [1999] ) gives rise to a peculiar feature of tournament-based incentives. Subjective performance evaluations assign explicit rewards (penalties) to workers that are not ranked at the top (bottom) of objective rankings. Consequently, other employees receive an implicit penalty (reward) by being ranked at the top (bottom) of the objective rankings but failing to receive (suffer) the reward (penalty) due to the subjective override. Explicit subjective rewards (penalties) correspond to bonuses (pay-cuts) actually assigned based on subjective evaluations, whereas implicit rewards (penalties) are only defined in terms of opportunity cost (missing out on a reward or avoiding a penalty). 5 Figure 1 summarizes the framework and the definitions.
-----Insert Figure 1 about here ----- Koszegi and Rabin [2006] posit that individuals measure gains and losses as favorable or unfavorable deviations from a reference point, which corresponds to their rational expectations 5 In the remainder of the paper we refer to explicit subjective rewards and penalties as subjective rewards and penalties.
held in recent past about outcomes and the utility associated with such outcomes. That is, when a person is rationally expecting to experience a positive (negative) event, if that event does not materialize it might feel like a loss (gain). On the one hand, objective rankings can give rise to rational expectations of receiving rewards or penalties. On the other hand, workers could embed in their rational expectations the uncertainty related to management subjective considerations in deciding the ultimate awardees of rewards and penalties, thereby assigning little to no weight to the objective rankings. Whether tournament contestants experience implicit rewards and penalties as gains and losses, which then exert influence on subsequent effort and performance, is an open empirical question. If they do, we expect to observe similar performance effects associated with both subjective and implicit rewards and penalties. If, instead, workers form rational expectations accounting for both objective and subjective management considerations, it is possible that implicit rewards and penalties have no material influence on subsequent effort choices. To resolve this tension, we formulate the following hypothesis in null form:
H2: Implicit rewards (penalties) have no effect on subsequent performance.
Finally, conditional on finding evidence that implicit reward and penalties influence subsequent choices of effort and performance, we study the relative magnitude of these effects.
Understanding the net effect of explicit and implicit rewards and penalties will provide important insights into the overall effects of subjectivity in tournament incentive systems. For every subjective reward (penalty), we can identify subjects experiencing a corresponding implicit penalty (reward). While subjective rewards and penalties correspond to actual changes in monetary wealth (i.e. bonus checks or pay-cuts), the associated implicit penalties and rewards are defined in terms of opportunity cost.
Standard economic theory predicts that gains or losses generate consistent changes in utility independently from being defined in terms of opportunity cost or actual changes in monetary wealth (Thaler [1980] ). However, empirical observations of consumer behavior led to the formalization of the endowment effect, by which opportunity costs payoffs are underweighted compared to out-of-pocket payoffs (Kahneman et al. [1990] , Thaler [1980] ). On this basis, we would predict that the effect of subjective rewards and penalties dominates the effect of implicit ones. However, the influence of subjectivity on the reaction to gains and losses and their actual versus opportunity cost nature has not been fully explored. It is plausible that the perception of bias and/or procedural injustice associated with the subjective determination of tournament outcomes might alter the relation documented insofar by the literature. We formulate the following hypothesis in null form:
H3: The magnitude of performance effects related to explicit subjective rewards (penalties) is not significantly different from the corresponding performance effects of implicit penalties (rewards).
The next section describes the empirical settings of our study, which exhibits features that are very favorable to empirically test the hypotheses formulated above.
III. EMPIRICAL SETTINGS
We use field data obtained from a Chinese manufacturing firm that operates a "carrot and stick" system to incentivize performance of its 11 departments. In each month of production, the members of the department with highest performance receive a monetary bonus ("carrot"), while the members of the department performing the worst are penalized with deductions from their pay ("stick"). Top executives in the firm make the reward/penalty decision based on two criteria: (1) a monthly department ranking based on a scorecard that aggregates multiple dimensions of performance (objective component), and (2) executives' discretion (subjective component).
Interviews of top executives reveal that their subjective considerations generally include assessments of overall attitude and employee morale, and account for uncontrollable factors impacting objective performance. However, there are no company guidelines on what these considerations should be and the rationale behind them is not recorded or disclosed. Thus, employees might experience the subjective component of the incentive system as a source of uncertainty in the mapping between effort and expected outcomes. Monetary rewards and penalties are fixed equivalent amounts, corresponding to about 12% of the monthly salary.
At the beginning of each fiscal year, top corporate executives set quantifiable monthly targets and weights relative to every dimension of objective performance included in the scorecard for all departments. 6 Monthly goals are set for each of the 12 months and are not renegotiated until the next annual target setting cycle. Department goals are assigned considering their different activities, interdependencies, and contribution to the overall performance of the firm. While monthly goals are department-specific, management believes that they are equally attainable by each department. In other words, the goal setting process corresponds to the handicap mechanisms invoked by Lazear and Rosen [1981] , Dye [1984] , and Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983] to ensure fairness in the tournament process. Departments receive monthly scores based on their achievements relative to assigned goals. Departments meeting target expectations on every performance dimension earn 100 points, however departments can score greater amounts of points when they exceed their targets. Departments are then ranked from best to worst based on their aggregate performance score, and the ranking is publicly disclosed within the firm.
Rewards and penalties are assigned at the end of each month of production. There is no carry-over of performance between tournaments. That is, performance evaluations in each month take into account exclusively the results achieved by each department in that month, with no consideration of prior performance. For the most part, department teams are fixed across tournaments and each team continues to perform the same activities throughout our sample period.
In addition to the objective performance scores, executives can use subjective criteria to choose departments to reward and penalize, and these choices (but not the criteria applied) are made public as well. Employees may therefore observe misalignment between the quantitative ranking and the ultimate reward (penalty) receivers, in cases when the subjective evaluation overrides the objective performance ranking.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
Our first hypothesis, expressed in null form, predicts that subjectivity generates no additional influence on subsequent performance compared to rewards and penalties corresponding uniquely to objective rankings. 7 In order to disentangle the effects on performance driven by the reward (penalty) from the effects of their subjective versus objective nature, we specify the following model: In all cases where the reward (penalty) is assigned to the top (bottom) ranked department in the objective rankings, we assume that there is no subjective override. It is of course possible that in those cases the outcomes of subjective and objective evaluations coincide. However, in these cases subjectivity would not be apparent to the workers.
indicator variable assuming the value of 1 if recipients of penalties in month (t-1) were determined by a subjective override of the objective performance rankings, and zero otherwise; BusyMontht is an indicator variable assuming the value of 1 if month t is considered to be a month of high production, and zero otherwise; 8 NEmpli,t represents the number of employees working in department i in month t; FPcti,t is the percentage of female employees working in department i in month t; AgeLess30i,t is the percentage of employees younger than 30 years of age working in department i in month t. We control for possible pre-existing performance trends by including the lagged change in performance observed in the previous month (ΔPerfScore(t-1)). Table 1 contains a description of all variables of interest for this study.
-----Insert Table 1 about here -----
The interaction term between reward (penalty) and subjective reward (penalty) event captures the incremental effect of subjective rewards (penalties) over objective rewards (penalties). Estimations yielding a significant coefficient 3 and/or 6 would allow us to reject the null hypothesis formalized with H1. Additionally, the event variables allow us to explore the main effects of observed subjectivity on the general population of employees that were not directly awarded a reward or penalty, and verify whether subjectivity might have a demotivating effect on general performance due to its interpretation as bias.
Next, we test whether contestants experience implicit and subjective rewards and penalties in similar ways (H2). Estimating the following model allows us to do so: 
where ImplPeni,(t-1) is an indicator variable assuming the value of 1 if department i in month (t-1) was ranked at the top of the objective performance ranking, but did not receive the reward due to subjective considerations, and zero otherwise; ImplRewi,(t-1) is an indicator variable assuming the value of 1 if department i in month (t-1) was ranked at the bottom of the objective performance ranking, but did not receive the penalty due to subjective considerations, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined as previously described.
Model (2) allows us also to test our additional hypothesis with respect to the relative magnitude of these effects (H3), by comparing the coefficients estimated respectively for SubjRewi,(t-1) and ImplPeni,(t-1), and those estimated for SubjPeni,(t-1) and ImplRewi,(t-1). We report the estimation results and our inferences in the next section. Supplemental analyses are presented in section IV.
V. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES TESTING
Our sample includes 25 monthly observations for each of the 11 departments of the firm. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. Our main dependent variable is the change in performance score (ΔPerfScorei,t), calculated as the difference in PerfScore between time t and time (t-1). Although the total possible number of performance points assigned at the time of target setting is 100 points for each department, departments that exceed expectations can obtain a score greater than 100.
Departments receive a reward (penalty) on average 2.182 (2.727) times out of 25 months. . On average, we observe that rewards and penalties are assigned subjectively about half of the times in our sample period. In 5 out of the 25 months, where we do not observe any explicit reward (either subjective or otherwise), while penalties are observed in each month. Subjective rewards (penalties) are assigned in 12 (13) out of 25 months. While in the vast majority of cases, one department per month receives the reward and one receives the penalty, in four instances during our sample period rewards were assigned subjectively to more than one department in the same month (that is, both the department ranked first based on objective evaluation and another department received a reward), and in five instances subjective penalties were assigned to more than one department in the same month (that is, both the department ranked last based on objective evaluations and another department were inflicted a penalty).
-----Insert Table 2 about here -----Correlation coefficients among our variables of interest reported in Table 3 indicate a strong likelihood of a reward (penalty) being assigned based on subjective performance evaluation -----Insert Table 3 about here -----To explore whether workers react to subjective and objective rewards and penalties in the same way (H1), we estimate model (1) using OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered at the department level, and include department fixed effects. 9 The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 4 . We control for potential pre-existing trend effects by including the lagged change in performance scores. We first estimate the model separately for rewards and penalties.
9 Panel data analyses often raise concerns associated with incidental parameter problems, which could bias the estimation of statistical models using OLS. The incidental parameter problem is typical of panels with large n and small t (respectively, large number of subjects and small number of periods) In our case, however, t is more than double n, thus reducing the incidental parameter concern to negligible levels (Nickell [1981] ). Table 4 , column (A) shows that subjectivity applied to the determination of a reward generates a positive incremental performance response (β3 = 28.46, p<0.05) that more than counterbalances the negative performance reaction observed in association with objectively determined rewards (β1 = -15.78, p<0.10). The estimation of model (1) with respect to penalties alone (Table 4 , column (B)) shows that subjective penalties drive an incremental negative response (β6 = -11.28, p<0.05) compared to objective penalties. These results remain consistent in the full estimation of the model (Table 4 , column (C)). Wald tests comparing the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in the full model confirm that the incremental effect of subjectivity is larger, in absolute value, than the effect of objectively determined rewards and penalties (p<0.01 for rewards and p<0.05 for penalties). Interestingly, in this specification, we find that workers respond to objectively determined rewards with a decrease in subsequent performance (β1 = -15.912 p<0.10), consistent with prior findings with respect to complacency of the winners (Berger et al. [2013] , Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez [2009] ), but we do not observe a significant reaction to penalties corresponding to objective rankings. Taken together, our results reject H1 and indicate that employees respond not only to receiving a reward or a penalty, but also to the procedure by which those awards are determined. Our results provide evidence consistent with the predictions of reciprocity theory, in that employees respond positively to subjective favorable treatment (subjective rewards) and negatively to unfavorable treatment (subjective penalty).
Importantly, model (1) includes variables representing the main effect of subjectivity on overall performance (SubjRewEvent(t-1) and SubjPenEvent(t-1)). Specifically, it is possible that simply observing subjectivity in the determination of rewards and penalties might drive subsequent performance changes independently from being directly impacted by it. That is, in line with the concerns expressed by Moers [2005] and Ittner et al. [2003] , subjective performance evaluations might drive widespread lower effort if workers perceive subjectivity to be a signal of bias. Based on the insignificance of the coefficients relative to SubjRewEvent and SubjPenEvent, we conclude that this is likely not the case in our settings, and that the responses documented by our statistical tests support our interpretation of reciprocal reactions to the subjective assignment of rewards and penalties.
-----Insert Table 4 about here -----Our second hypothesis explores how employees might experience implicit rewards and penalties. Table 5 summarizes the results of our estimation of model (2). Similarly to our tests for H1, we estimate our model using OLS with standard errors clustered by department and include department fixed effects. Coefficients estimated in our comprehensive specification are reported in Colum (C). We document positive (negative) reactions associated with implicit rewards (penalties) (β1 = 10.75, p<0.05; β2 = -12.58, p<0.05). Our tests reject the null hypothesis expressed with H2, and show that in presence of subjective overrides of objective performance rankings, workers respond to implicit rewards (penalties) with subsequent performance changes that have the same sign as the reactions associated with subjective rewards (penalties) documented above.
That is, in line with the theoretical predictions of referent-dependent preferences, workers experience implicit rewards and penalties as deviations from their rational expectations based on objective rankings, and therefore interpret such deviations as gains and losses respectively, despite knowing that the determination of the ultimate awards involves an element of subjectivity.
We then compare the magnitude of the effects of subjective and implicit rewards and penalties to test H3. Based on the results of Wald tests reported at the bottom of Table 5 (p>0.10),
we conclude that the effects on subsequent performance associated with an implicit penalty (reward) offset those generated by a corresponding subjective reward (penalty), with a net effect that is not distinguishable from zero. This result fails to reject the null hypotheses described in H3 and points to some interesting tradeoffs that have not previously been explored in the literature.
Managers implementing subjective performance evaluations in tournament systems need to consider these additional effects stemming from the introduction of implicit rewards and penalties.
Interestingly, our results are in contrast with the predictions of the endowment effect, as we document that rewards and penalties defined in terms of opportunity cost appear to be drive similar responses as do rewards and penalties impacting the workers monetary wealth. We conjecture that the presence of subjectivity in the determination of rewards and penalties might be a driver of this unexpected result. Additionally, while the endowment effect is formulated at the individual level, our unit of analysis is the department, which could introduce group dynamics that might influence our results.
-----Insert Table 5 about here -----All our results are robust to the influence of outliers. We have repeated all our tests winsorizing the dependent variables at the 1 st an 99 th , 5 th and 95 th , and at the 10 th and 90 th percentile in each month and found results (untabulated) that are consistent with those reported in this manuscript.
VI. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES

VI.I: Extent of subjective override
Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez [2009] find that contestants tend to give up when they are not in a winning position and the gap between their level of performance and that associated with likely winners becomes too wide. Berger et al. [2013] , on the other hand, find that contestants are more likely to give up if they fall just outside the range of performance scores that would qualify them for a reward. These conflicting findings suggest that the distance to winning or losing positions in tournaments might be an important driver of subsequent behavior. We therefore analyze the impact of subjectivity on subsequent performance by exploring the influence of the "magnitude" of the subjective ex-post correction (e.g. a subjective adjustment to assign a reward to a department who is only 5 points away from the top-ranked department is smaller than the one applied to reward a department whose score is 20 points lower).
In our settings, the firm publicly discloses the objective performance scores and rankings of all departments, as well as the identity of the departments assigned rewards and penalties. In addition to allowing employees to observe whether or not there was a subjective override of the objective performance ranking, this disclosure provides information as to the difference in performance points between the top (bottom) ranked department and the department ultimately awarded the reward (penalty).
On the one hand, a reciprocal response to favorable or unfavorable treatment should be amplified by the magnitude of the subjective adjustment to the objective performance ranking.
That is, rebalancing the economic exchange between workers and organization might require a larger effort adjustment depending on the "size" of the gift or injustice. On the other hand, however, it is possible that employees whose performance is far from the top performers might not believe it to be possible for them to perform at the highest level, and, therefore, they might not increase their effort in subsequent periods (Becker and Huselid [1992] , Casas-Arce and Martinez- Prendergast and Topel [1993] ). Workers that are closer to the scores of top-ranking departments might be in a better position to improve their performance, and provide an ex-post justification for their subjective award (Berger et al. [2013] ). At the other end of the continuum, workers that are penalized despite a larger spread between their score and that of the bottom ranked department might perceive a greater disconnect between their effort and the reward/penalty system and limit their future investment in effort (Aryee et al. [2004] ).
We test the effect of the magnitude of the subjective adjustment on the intensity of the performance response to subjective rewards and penalties by estimating model (1) Table 6 .
We find that the positive reaction to subjective rewards is driven by cases in which the subjective adjustment is smaller (β3 = 38.07, p<0.05 for the short subjective distance sample), in line with prior literature documenting performance improvements only for workers for whom effort increases would make a significant difference in outcomes (Berger et al. [2013] ). On the other hand, the effect of subjective penalties is consistent with pooled sample results only in the long subjective distance sample (β6 = -16.06, p<0.05). This result further supports our inference about reciprocity being the underlying mechanism driving the reaction to subjective penalties, as a longer subjective distance in the awarding of subjective penalties is likely to be interpreted as greater organizational injustice and therefore drive greater resentment, which in turns will reduce effort for employees seeking greater redress (Matsumura and Shin [2006] ).
-----Insert Table 6 about here -----
IV.II: Persistence of performance effects
Berger et al. [2013] find that there are temporal differences in the emergence of post-tournament effects. In particular, they find that complacency is observed immediately after the award of a prize, while giving up is observed with a delay, and only after the loser attempts a change in strategy. In similar fashion, we examine the lagged effects of subjective and implicit rewards in repeated tournament. We explore the timing of performance effects associated with subjective and implicit rewards and penalties, and whether performance responses associated with subjectivity are limited to short term reactions or persist for multiple periods. We estimate model (2) including a second lag for the variables SubjPen, SubjRew, ImplPen, and ImplRew. Results are reported in Table 7 .
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The full estimation is reported in Table 7 , Column (C). We find that the effects of subjective rewards and penalties are temporary and tend to reverse in the subsequent period. In particular, a department receiving a subjective reward in a certain month is likely to improve performance in the subsequent month (β1 = 15.70, p<0.01), but exhibit no further performance change in the month after that. With respect to penalties, instead, workers receiving subjective penalties decrease performance in the following month (β3 = -8.63, p<0.01), but then exhibit an equivalent improvement in the month after that (β4 = 8.03, p<0.05). That is, the effects of subjective penalties fully reverse in the second period after the infliction of the penalty, while there are no incremental effects beyond the short term with respect to subjective rewards.
Interestingly, however, we find that the effects of implicit rewards and penalties persist beyond the month following the experience. In fact, our estimations reported in Column C of Table 7 show that workers experiencing an implicit reward will improve performance both in the following month (β5 = 9.42, p<0.05), and in the month after that (β6 = 16.23, p<0.05). Similarly, the performance response of workers experiencing an implicit penalty persists two months after the experience (β8 = -8. 35, p<0.10) . Surprisingly, in this specification we don't find a significant negative response to implicit penalties in the subsequent month, however we caveat our findings with the possibility that the full specification of the model might be suffering from low statistical power.
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-----Insert Table 7 about here -----
VI.III: Implicit Rewards and Penalties and Rank-First/Rank-Last Effects
It is possible that the relationship between implicit rewards (penalties) and subsequent performance reactions might be confounded by the effect of being ranked at the bottom (top) of the objective rankings. Workers ranked at the top of objective rankings might decrease performance in the subsequent period for reasons other than receiving a reward or experiencing an implicit penalty. Top-ranked workers might become overconfident in their abilities and reduce effort. Alternatively, top ranking performance might be facilitated by stochastic events that are not likely to repeat in the next periods. Finally, maintaining high levels of performance over extended periods of time might be difficult. At the other end of the spectrum, being ranked at the bottom might suffice to trigger social comparison mechanisms (Fredrickson [1992] ), which in turn might lead to performance improvements to preserve reputation. Bottom ranking might also represent meaningful information for the workers about future likelihood of receiving a penalty if their performance does not improve. Therefore, performance improvements might be driven by being ranked last independently from receiving a penalty or an implicit reward. To rule out these alternative explanations, we define and test the following model: 
Estimation results are reported in Table 8 . When we examine the effect of implicit rewards controlling for the rank-last effect, we continue to find a significant incremental effect on subsequent performance (β2 = 10.43, p<0.01 - Table 8 , Column (C)), which confirms our prior conclusions about the influence of implicit rewards on workers' choices of effort in subsequent tournaments. However, when controlling for the effect of being ranked first, we do not find any additional effect of implicit penalties on subsequent performance. While we cannot conclusively rule out alternative explanations for the performance effects of implicit penalties, these results further support our findings with respect to implicit rewards.
-----Insert Table 8 about here -----
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study explores the consequences of subjectivity on subsequent performance and effort allocations in a setting where a repeated tournament incentive system involves both rewards and penalties. Using field data from a Chinese manufacturing company, we study the performance response to subjective ex-post adjustments of objective performance rankings for the determination of monthly monetary rewards and penalties. We find that subjective allocations of tournament payoffs drive different reactions compared to assignment of rewards and penalties determined by objective performance metrics alone. Additionally, we document how the tournament structure of the incentive system generates additional implicit effects. That is, when a reward (penalty) is assigned to a department not ranked at the top (bottom) based on objective performance, such top (bottom) ranked department experiences an implicit penalty (reward). We distinguish between explicit subjective penalties, which correspond to actual monetary bonuses or pay-cuts, from implicit rewards and penalties, which are defined only in terms of opportunity cost (i.e. missing out on a reward or being spared from a penalty). We find that implicit rewards and penalties have performance effects consistent with those associated with subjective explicit ones.
In particular, we find that the effect of subjective explicit rewards (penalties) and implicit penalties (rewards) counterbalance each other with an aggregate net effect that is not distinguishable from zero. Our study is the first to document the effect of implicit rewards and penalties in tournament settings.
Our results extend prior literature on repeated and dynamic tournaments, and are in line with the predictions of equity theory and reciprocity, whereby workers that experience a subjective or implicit reward interpret it as favorable treatment, and in return work even harder in the following period, while workers experiencing an unfavorable treatment due to subjective or implicit penalties tend to reduce subsequent effort to seek redress of unfavorable treatment.
Additionally, we find that the response to subjective rewards is predominantly driven by small subjective adjustments, while the negative response to subjective penalties is stronger if the subjective adjustment is large. Finally, we find that the effects of subjective rewards and penalties tend to reverse within the next month, while the reactions to implicit rewards and penalties are more persistent.
While our field setting is ideal to explore our phenomenon of interest, our study is subject to the limitations that are common to field studies. In particular, since our study is based on a single manufacturing organization based in China, the generalizability of our results to different industries and cultures is limited. Additionally, our findings, especially those relative to implicit rewards and penalties, depend on contestants having sufficient information on their objective performance to detect the application of subjectivity in the determination of tournament outcomes.
While disclosure of both objective and subjective performance evaluation results is rarely observed, we posit that our findings apply to any situation in which workers might have at least
some information of what tournament outcomes would have been in absence of subjectivity (e.g.
number of papers published in top journals, number of projects successfully completed, results of physical tests).
Despite these limitations, our findings contribute to the literature on subjectivity in incentive contracting by exploring the contemporaneous effects of subjective and implicit rewards and penalties and providing evidence of the associated trade-offs. We contribute to the practice of incentive design by documenting offsetting effects of subjective performance evaluations that may significantly impact the overall effectiveness of incentive systems in organizations. Notes: Figure 1 describes the definitions of rewards and penalties we utilize in this study. Panel A represents an illustration the effect of subjective overrides on the assignment of rewards and penalties, including the generation of implicit rewards and penalties, for a hypothetical group of 6 tournament contestants. Panel B describes the relationship between explicit and implicit rewards, and the classification of explicit rewards into subjective and objective. Rewards and penalties are defined as Explicit when a department is awarded a reward or inflicted a penalty, regardless of the method of determination. When explicit rewards and penalties correspond to the objective performance rankings, we define them to be Objective, while they are Subjective if the assignment of the reward or penalty is determined by a subjective override of the objective performance rankings. Rewards (penalties) are Implicit when, due to subjective evaluations, departments are not assigned a penalty (reward) despite ranking at the bottom (top) of the distribution based on objective performance measurement.
Rewards & Penalties
Explicit Implicit Objective Subjective Notes: This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among all of our variables of interest for the estimation of our statistical models. Two-tail statistical significance of the correlation coefficients is indicated as follows: * = (p<0.10), ** = (p<0.05), *** = (p<0.01). Table 4 reports the coefficients estimated for equation (1) considering only rewards (A), only penalties (B) and rewards and penalties combined (C). In all cases estimations are performed using OLS with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. For each coefficient we reported t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable ΔPerfScore, is calculated as PerfScore(t) -PerfScore(t-1). We include department fixed effects and we cluster our standard errors at the department level. Two-tail statistical significance indicated by: * = (p<0.10), ** = (p<0.05), *** = (p<0.01). The bottom row reports the results of Wald tests, where we analyze the statistical significance between the indicated coefficients. The null hypothesis is that the difference between the absolute value of the coefficients is not statistically different than zero. A p-value (reported in brackets) below 0.10 (0.05) [0.01] would allow us to reject the null with confidence at the 90% (95%) [99%], two-tailed. Table 6 reports the coefficients estimated for equation (1) on subsamples constructed by eliminating the observations that had a value of SubjDist shorter than the median value (A) and by eliminating the observations that had a value of SubjDist greater than the median (B). In both cases, we maintained the same control group. Estimations are performed using OLS with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. For each coefficient we reported t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable ΔPerfScore, is calculated as PerfScore(t) -PerfScore(t-1). We include department fixed effects and we cluster our standard errors at the department level. Two-tail statistical significance indicated by: * = (p<0.10), ** = (p<0.05), *** = (p<0.01). The rightmost column reports the results of Chi-Square tests, where we compare the coefficients indicated across the two estimations. The null hypothesis is that the difference between the absolute value of the coefficients is not statistically different than zero. A p-value (reported in brackets) below 0.10 (0.05) [0.01] would allow us to reject the null with confidence at the 90% (95%) [99%], two-tailed. 
